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Ethiopia  has  implemented  one  of the  largest,  fastest  and  least  expensive  land  registration  and  certiﬁcation
reforms  in Africa.  While  there  is  evidence  that this  ‘ﬁrst-stage’  land  registration  has  had positive  effects
in  terms  of increased  investment,  land  productivity  and  land  rental  market  activities,  the  government
is  now  piloting  another  round  of  land  registration  and  certiﬁcation  that  involves  technically  advanced
land  survey  methods  and computer  registration.  This  ‘second-stage’  land  registration  differs  from  the
registration  system  employed  in  the  ﬁrst round  that  used  ﬁeld  markings  in  conjunction  with  neigh-
bors’  recollections  to  identify  plot  borders.  We  use  panel  data  from  600  households  in southern  Ethiopia
to  investigate  household  perceptions  of  and  demand  for  such  a new  registration  and  certiﬁcation.  Our
study  revealed  relatively  low  demand  and  willingness-to-pay  (WTP)  for  second-stage  certiﬁcates.  Thethiopia WTP also  decreases  signiﬁcantly  from  2007  to 2012.  Our  ﬁndings  indicate  that farmers  do  not  believe
that  the  second-stage  certiﬁcate  enhances  tenure  security  relative  to  the  ﬁrst-stage  certiﬁcate  except
in instances  in  which  ﬁrst-stage  certiﬁcation  was  poorly  implemented.  The  demand  for  second-stage
certiﬁcates  appears  to  come  primarily  from  governmental  authorities,  as it can  provide  a  better  basis  for
land  administration  and  produce  accessible  public  documentation  of  land-related  affairs.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY licensentroduction
Ethiopia has implemented one of the largest, fastest and least
xpensive land registration and certiﬁcation reforms in Africa
Deininger et al., 2008). While there is some variation in how land
egistration and certiﬁcation has been implemented across, and
ven within, regions in Ethiopia, the broad-scale ﬁrst-stage land
egistration and certiﬁcation involved the registration and demar-
ation of land plots using simple local technologies that required
ittle training. The main sources for determining plot boundaries
ere ﬁeld markings, in conjunction with the memories of the
eighbors whose farm plots border those owned by the households
n question. Measuring tapes and ropes were used to measure the
arm plots. While the initial cost of this registration was extremely
ow (approximately 1 US$ per farm plot or less), its impact in
mproving tenure security has been signiﬁcant, as evidenced by
ncreased investment, land productivity and land rental market
ctivity (Deininger et al., 2008, 2011; Holden et al., 2009, 2011a;
ezabih et al., 2012).
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However, the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation had limitations with
respect to the maintenance and updating of land registration
records. Ethiopia has begun piloting and introducing a second-
stage land registration and certiﬁcation in selected districts in the
highland regions. The new registration and certiﬁcation system
involves registering the precise geographical locations and sizes
of individual farm plots using technologies such as GPS, satel-
lite imagery or orthography. Farmers receive plot-level certiﬁcates
with maps rather than a household-level certiﬁcate. The aim is
that the second-stage land registration and certiﬁcation effort will
enhance tenure security, the maintenance and updating of records,
and land management (MOA, 2013b).
The second-stage land registration and certiﬁcation will likely
be substantially more costly than the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation and
will also require much longer to complete. If the primary pur-
pose of the second-stage certiﬁcate is to increase tenure security
for farmers, it is important to explore their perceptions of, inter-
est in and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for such plot-level certiﬁcates
that include maps. During the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation, farmers typ-
ically paid a fee to receive their certiﬁcates. If planners expect
that part of the costs of the second-stage certiﬁcation will also
be recouped through such a fee, given the high budgetary costs
associated with this project, the farmers’ WTP  should be esti-
mated. We  use data from 600 households in Oromia region and
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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outhern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) region to inves-
igate household perceptions of and WTP  for such a second-stage
ertiﬁcate. We  assessed the WTP  in monetary terms and using the
umber of labor-days that households were willing to supply in
xchange for the second-stage land certiﬁcates. Our data cover sub-
tantial variation in agro-ecological conditions, market access and
rban expansion. The household panel data from 2007 and 2012
llow us to assess how the demand for second-stage certiﬁcates
as changed over time in our study areas. The ﬁndings should be
ighly relevant for the design of future land administration reforms
n Ethiopia and elsewhere, e.g., to identify the types of areas to tar-
et ﬁrst and whether the recipients are willing to pay a large share
f the costs of the second-stage reform.
The analyses reveal limited interest in the second-stage cer-
iﬁcate, especially compared to the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate. Both the
eneral interest in second-stage certiﬁcates and the amounts that
nterested households are willing to pay for such a certiﬁcate
eclined from 2007 to 2012. Our econometric analyses indicate
hat households that participated in public meetings concerning
he ﬁrst-stage registration and certiﬁcation and households that
xperienced land disputes before the ﬁrst-stage registration are
ore likely to show interest in a second-stage certiﬁcate. However,
ale headed households for which only the name of the husband
ppears on the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate and households that had suf-
cient witnesses for border demarcation exhibit low interest in a
ew certiﬁcate. Households that have larger land holdings have
ower WTP.
iterature review
and registration and land titling
A land title is a written document providing proof of ownership,
nd this ownership is also recorded in a publicly recognized central
and registry. Modern land titles are associated with high quality
nd accurate maps and coordinates that can be used to verify the
xact spatial boundaries of such property. Upgrading land-titling
ystems has been a gradual process in most countries due to the
ostly and time-consuming nature of the work. In many countries,
his has been a demand-based process in which those demanding
he title have had to pay for the costs. Such procedures have often
een associated with slow bureaucratic processes and numerous
teps that have created opportunities for corruption, rent-seeking
nd “elite capture”. They have also created an unleveled play-
ng ﬁeld where the poor and less connected have typically been
arginalized. Many have therefore become skeptical of formaliz-
ng land rights through land titling in developing countries contexts
uch as in Africa. Land titling has been perceived as a threat to cus-
omary land rights (Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Cotula et al., 2004).
ome have challenged the very claim that land registration and
itling have the potential to improve production in poor countries,
articularly in Africa (Atwood, 1990; Bromley, 2008). They argue
hat the premises on which this claim is based, such as land registra-
ion providing small farmers with access to credit or encouraging
hem to invest in their land, are themselves based on a simplis-
ic model of rural land rights (Atwood, 1990) and have not been
upported by strong empirical evidence (Bromley, 2008).
Feder and Nishio (1999) reviewed successful land registration
nd titling programs in Asia and Latin America and observed posi-
ive effects on investment, credit access, land productivity and land
alue. Such effects were found in Thailand, The Philippines (urban
reas), Indonesia (urban areas), Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru. A
tudy in rural India (Pender and Kerr, 1994) found no signiﬁcant
ositive effects on investment or credit access. Studies on Africa
Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda) (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991) found thatlicy 41 (2014) 193–205
land registration had no signiﬁcant impact on land productivity,
land investment or credit access. Jacoby and Minten (2007) also
found no signiﬁcant effects of land titling in Madagascar. Besley
(1995), however, found a positive effect of new land rights on
investment in trees in one area in Ghana. Feder and Nishio (1999)
emphasize that numerous prerequisites have to be in place before
the positive impacts of land registration can be achieved, includ-
ing weaknesses in existing formal or informal tenure systems that
therefore do not provide the necessary tenure security that is essen-
tial for investment. Positive impacts on access to credit markets
and land markets will not occur unless such markets exist. Lending
institutions cannot use land as collateral unless there is a well-
functioning land sales market. Land laws and land administrations
capable of implementing the laws and land registration and titling
systems in a transparent and reliable manner and with clear conﬂict
resolution systems are essential. There is a risk that the introduc-
tion of a modern registry system to replace a traditional tenure
system could result in land grabbing (“elite capture”) by better
informed, more inﬂuential and wealthier stakeholders. There are
fears that the effect could increase landlessness and result in the
formalization of land rights having negative effects on the poor.
Local participation in the process and simple, efﬁcient and trans-
parent procedures are also important for creating popular demand
and success.
Both customary and statutory tenure systems have tended to
exhibit a gender bias in favor of men  over women. Land titles have
typically been allocated to the head of the household, who in most
cases is a man. There have been numerous cases in which formal-
izing land rights through land titling has undermined customary
land rights, which have been ignored or disrespected.
Costs of formalizing land rights
The high cost of land titling has forced many countries to estab-
lish a system of land titling on demand, and this has made land titles
costlier and only available to the wealthy (Benjaminsen et al., 2009;
Besley and Burgess, 2000; Cotula et al., 2004; Deininger, 2003).
Therefore, there is substantial need for more low-cost, broad-
scale and egalitarian systems for land registration in low-income
countries. In Honduras, the cost of land titling was  estimated at
600 US$ per title (Lopez, 1996), while in Madagascar it has been
estimated at 150 US$ per household under the conventional sys-
tem of titling on demand (Jacoby and Minten, 2007). Burns et al.
(2007) assessed the variation in costs across numerous countries
and found average costs of between 20 and 55 US$ per parcel.
Ayalew et al. (2011) provide an estimate of the costs of hiring pri-
vate surveyors for titling on demand for urban land owners in Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania of approximately 350 US$. The Ethiopian ﬁrst-
stage land registration and certiﬁcation system lies at the other
extreme, where the cost of registration and certiﬁcation was esti-
mated to be approximately 1 US$ per farm plot or 3.5 US$ per
household (Deininger et al., 2008).
In assessing the optimal quality level in a land formalization
scheme, it is important to assess the marginal beneﬁts versus
marginal costs of increasing the formalization quality of land rights.
As Deininger and Feder (2009) note, there are many examples
of supply-driven land formalization programs that were imple-
mented based on lobbying by survey professionals and lead to
excessively high technical standards relative to the demand for
such formalization and the actual land values. Such programs may
even have created competition with traditional tenure systems and
undermined the latter. This may  also explain why  some conven-
tional land-titling programs such as in Kenya and Madagascar have
not resulted in any signiﬁcant impacts (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991;
Jacoby and Minten, 2007) and others have resulted in speculative





















































rented out by female landlords than those owned by male land-
lords. They also found that welfare improvements, measured asS. Bezu, S. Holden / Land 
egree of precision in plot boundary identiﬁcation for mapping
urposes has a strong inﬂuence on the costs of land rights formal-
zation. The costs of technical formalization increase exponentially
n the precision level (Deininger and Feder, 2009). The Ethiopian
rst-stage registration was able at to achieve high precision at a
ery low cost without mapping by adopting ﬁeld demarcation and
sing neighbors as witnesses.
The trend in low-income countries is toward intermediate solu-
ions to the classical land-titling approach by unbundling this
one-size-ﬁts-all” approach to specifying land rights by using low-
ost, broad-scale registration with high local participation and/or
impler, less costly and less precise technologies, issuing simpler
ertiﬁcates without maps, etc. Technological advances facilitate
ore low-cost technical approaches that utilize GPS, satellite
mages, computers, and new software to generate maps and reg-
stry systems at a much lower cost than the traditional approach
o land titling. Centralized and computerized mapping and registry
ystems are easier to maintain and update. Such “intermediate”
ystems have recently been introduced in a number of countries,
ncluding at a broad scale in Rwanda and at the pilot level in Ethiopia
nd Tanzania. The least expensive of these methods imply certain
acriﬁces in the accuracy of the identiﬁcation of plot boundaries,
s the accuracy of the low-cost GPS systems that are commonly
sed may  only be at the 5–10 m level. Nevertheless, this resolu-
ion may  be sufﬁcient for mapping purposes. However, such maps
annot be used as a basis for resolving plot boundary disputes
elated to small-scale encroachment by neighbors. The latest low-
ost approaches using satellite images can increase precision to
he range of to 1–2 m and may  therefore reduce the potential risk
f border disputes due to inaccuracy.
eview of land registration and certiﬁcation in Ethiopia
We  will begin this section by deﬁning the term land regis-
ration as used in this paper. Land registration is a process of
ocating, measuring and registering farm plots belonging to rural
arm households in Ethiopia. For individual households, certiﬁcates
re not issued when their land is registered. Typically, certiﬁcates
re issued once all village (‘kebelle’) land has been registered and
eriﬁed. In addition to the inevitable lag between registration and
ertiﬁcation, border and inheritance disputes may  also delay the
ssuance of certiﬁcates for lands that have been registered.
irst-stage land registration and certiﬁcation
Land registration in Ethiopia began with a registration program
n Tigray in 1998 followed by one in the Amhara region in 2002.
he other two highland regions, Oromia and the Southern Nations
ationalities and Peoples (SNNP), initiated registration in 2004.
ccording to the Rural Land Use Directorate at the Ministry of
griculture, more than 90% of farming households in these regions
eceived their land certiﬁcates through the ﬁrst-stage registration
MOA, 2013a).
ttributes, strengths and weaknesses
ain Attributes
The following are the main attributes of Ethiopia’s low-cost ﬁrst-
tage land registration and certiﬁcation scheme:
Broad-scale registration: Communities were registered in a
single, sweeping exercise within a short period of time. Approxi-
mately 6 million households and 20 million plots were registered
and certiﬁed within a few years (Deininger et al., 2008).
Participatory registration process: There was  high degree of
involvement by locals in the identiﬁcation and demarcation of
plot boundaries, with neighbors serving as witnesses.licy 41 (2014) 193–205 195
• Registration was  performed using simple, user-friendly tech-
nology: Ropes were used for plot measurement, and simple,
handwritten forms were employed to record information. Reg-
istry books with information on households are maintained at
the community and district levels.
• The certiﬁcates given to individual households include: Infor-
mation on the plots belonging to these households, name (and
photo of household head and other household members in some
regions), location name, plot size, land quality, and the names of
neighbors for each plot.
Strengths.
• No need for skilled surveyors: Existing or temporarily hired staff
with only short-term training registered the land.
• Low cost registration and certiﬁcation.
• Less time was  required to register millions of farm plots relative
to technically demanding registration.
• Transparency was achieved through broad participation.
• The conﬂict resolution system builds on existing systems through
the use of local conﬂict mediators and social courts and is sup-
plemented with newly established local Land Administrative
Committees (there is variation across regions and over time).
Weaknesses.
• Maintenance of records: The registry books are difﬁcult to update
in the event of land inheritances, gifts or divisions due to divorce.
• Households, but not plots, have unique identiﬁcation numbers.
• The certiﬁcate does not contain maps of the farm plots.
• Accessing information for the purpose of land administration and
policy analysis is difﬁcult, as data registration is paper-based and
not easily available.
Deininger et al. (2008) provided an overview of the Ethiopian
low-cost approach. In a survey of 2315 households, they asked
about the willingness to pay (WTP) for lost certiﬁcate to obtain
information on households’ valuations of the certiﬁcates. The WTP
was highest in the Oromia region (mean 22 EB1), followed by
Amhara (mean 9 EB), SNNP (mean 7 EB) and Tigray (mean 5 EB).
Based on existing registration practices in Amhara, they estimated
a ﬁrst-registration cost of 30 EB per household and 8.3 EB per plot,
indicating that even in the ﬁrst-stage registration system, the full
cost may  not be recovered through registration fees.
Impacts of the ﬁrst-stage land registration and certiﬁcation in
Ethiopia
A number of studies have investigated the impacts of this low-
cost land registration and certiﬁcation process in Ethiopia. Holden
et al. (2009) provide evidence of the investment and land pro-
ductivity effects of land registration and certiﬁcation in the Tigray
region. They found evidence of signiﬁcant and positive investment
impacts on tree planting and the maintenance of soil conserva-
tion structures. Land productivity was found to be approximately
40% higher on plots with certiﬁcates than on plots without certiﬁ-
cates. Holden et al. (2011a) found that land certiﬁcation enhanced
tenure security, the willingness to rent out land and the amounts of
land rented out by landlord households in the Tigray region, espe-
cially for female-headed landlord households. Holden and Ghebru
(2013) investigated this issue further and found that productiv-
ity on rented-out land has improved to a greater extent on plotsreal per adult equivalent consumption expenditures, increased
1 EB-Birr, the Ethiopian currency. Current exchange rate, 1 USD ≈ 18.70.
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igniﬁcantly in duration of land certiﬁcate ownership, particularly
or female certiﬁcate holders.
Deininger et al. (2011) observed similar early impacts on tenure
ecurity, land renting and investment in the Amhara region of
thiopia but did not carefully investigate the gender dimensions.
ezabih et al. (2012) employed the same data from the Amhara
egion and found a stronger productivity impact of certiﬁcation on
ented land, and this impact was the most substantial for female
wners.
Holden and Tefera (2008) assessed the early impacts of joint
rst-stage land certiﬁcation in southern Ethiopia (5 districts in the
romia and SNNP regions). For male heads of households, one can
iscern two effects: (a) a positive effect of registration and certiﬁ-
ation in the form of enhanced tenure security for the household
nd (b) a negative effect for the male head in the form of reduced
ntra-household control over the land if the joint certiﬁcation
nhances women’s positions and land rights within households.
heir study revealed that the large majority of male heads of house-
olds perceived there to be a net positive effect from the process
nd therefore welcomed the joint land certiﬁcation.
Holden et al. (2011b) investigated the impact on land disputes,
articularly that on land border disputes in Tigray, using a sample
f 405 local conﬂict mediators from 85 villages. The local con-
ict mediators perceived land border disputes to be among the
ost difﬁcult disputes to mediate. Of the mediators surveyed, 68%
elieved that such conﬂicts had declined after the registration and
ertiﬁcation while 12% perceived that there had been an increase.
conometric analysis revealed that the increase in border dis-
utes was associated with low-quality land registration work with
espect to plot boundary demarcation and measurement and fail-
res to demarcate community borders. However, such low-quality
ork appeared to have only been performed in a fairly small share
f the communities considered. In a similar study of 180 conﬂict
ediators in the Oromia and SNNP regions, Holden and Tefera
2008) found that there was  a signiﬁcant reduction in disputes after
egistration and certiﬁcation in areas where such disputes were
ommon before registration.
The above studies reveal important beneﬁts of the ﬁrst-stage
and certiﬁcation through: (1) enhanced tenure security due to a
educed risk of land redistribution; (2) improved plot boundary
emarcation through the use of witnesses and thus a reduced risk
f encroachment by neighbors; and (3) improved transferability of
and through the rental market.
econd-stage land registration and certiﬁcation
The website of the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (2013)
escribes the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation as “a process of provid-
ng “simple” temporary landholding certiﬁcates. . . Under Stage
, farmers receive temporary certiﬁcates with no geo-referencing
r mapping of land parcels” (MOA, 2013a). The more permanent
econd-stage certiﬁcate, therefore, “seeks to rectify the weak-
esses in the Stage 1 land certiﬁcation, particularly the need to
eo-reference and map  individual parcels to avoid or minimize
oundary disputes.” The objective of the second-stage certiﬁcation,
ccording to MOA, is to enhance tenure security for smallholder
armers. Land administrators across the four large regional states
f Ethiopia have been piloting the second-stage land registration
nd certiﬁcation scheme since 2005. Registrations conducted dur-
ng the pilot stage beneﬁted from donor support through various
rograms.
One of the largest programs is the USAID-funded ELTAP/ELAP
rogram that covers 24 districts (woredas) across the four large
egions. Cadastral surveying is performed using hand-held GPS
evices, while the data were processed and stored on computers.
here are some indications that this method of land registrationlicy 41 (2014) 193–205
will be scaled up at national level for rural land registration (Wood
et al., 2012). Handheld GPS devices are not particularly expensive,
with prices in the range of USD 200–USD 600, but their accu-
racy level is 5–15 m.  There have also been other pilot programs
that employed alternative land surveying methods. A SIDA-funded
project in Amhara used total stations and precision GPS devices,
which are believed to be accurate to the millimeter but are highly
expensive (USD 40,000) and require cars to transport from place
to place (SARDP, 2010). The Finland-funded REILA (Responsible &
Innovative Land Administration) project is currently conducting
trials in four Ethiopian Regions using orthophotos that are pro-
duced from aerial photographs and satellite images. One district
is selected from each of the four regions for the trial. The esti-
mated cost of the second-stage land registration scheme based on
the imagery trial completed thus far is USD 8.5 per parcel (Hailu and
Harris, 2013). While there seems to be a consensus among imple-
menters regarding the desirability of a new land certiﬁcate with
plot maps and geo-referencing, it is unclear which of the land sur-
vey methods will eventually be adopted to register rural farmland
at the national level. It may  be possible that different regional states
will adopt different land surveying methods or a combination of
thereof depending on the type of landscape, the value of land and
the precision required.
From a study that covers 2315 households across Ethiopia,
Deininger et al. (2008) found that approximately 90% of the sample
stated that they would like to have a map  on their certiﬁcates and
were willing to pay for such a map. However, no questions were
asked on how much they would be willing to pay for the map. The
study also provides cost estimates for high-precision land registra-
tion using electronic total stations of 49 EB per plot and 175 EB per
household and for low-precision registration using handheld GPS
of 13 EB per plot and 45 EB per household. There are an estimated 50
million land parcels in Ethiopia (Hailu and Harris, 2013). Whichever
land survey method is used, the costs of mapping all parcels will
be tremendous. However, the mapping and registration costs are
not the only costs involved or the only logistics to be considered.
While updating and maintaining the data with computerized regis-
tration is easier than paper-based registration, the associated costs
are not negligible, and access to electricity is also a challenge (see
Deininger et al., 2008).
The second-stage certiﬁcates produced through the pilot pro-
grams thus far have often been distributed to farmers free of charge.
It is unclear, however, whether this practice will continue if and
when the second-stage registration is scaled up. If farmers believe
that the second-stage certiﬁcate will provide additional private
beneﬁts, they may  be willing to pay for the service, and thus they
may  be expected to cover part of the costs of the new registration
and certiﬁcation in the form of certiﬁcate fees.
Implementation of land registration and certiﬁcation in the
Oromia and SNNP regions
Oromia region
The land registration and certiﬁcation process began in the
Oromia region in 2003/04, with regional employees training
district-level land administration staff. Land Administration Com-
mittees (LACs) were established at the community (kebelle) level
with representatives from the villages (sub-kebelles). Registration
began with the demarcation of community and village borders,
communal land and public land. Individual land was demarcated,
and a form was ﬁlled in the ﬁeld. Another form was subsequently
ﬁlled and kept at community level. The social court addressed
complaints. The registration books and certiﬁcates are prepared
at district level, while only the forms are maintained at the com-































































stage certiﬁcates, only 54% reported being interested in obtaining
such a certiﬁcate, a 17% decline in demand from 2007. This may
be an indication that farmers consider the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcateS. Bezu, S. Holden / Land 
efore certiﬁcates are issued. Certiﬁcates can be collected at the
ebelle level at a price of 5 EB (Holden and Tefera, 2008).
The certiﬁcate contains the name of the household head under
land holders’ in the ﬁrst line and the spouse’s name under ‘name of
pouse’ in the second line, followed by a list of the names of other
ousehold members. The certiﬁcate only contains a photograph of
he household head. If the household is polygamous, the photo of
he husband and his name as ‘land holder’ only appears on one of
he certiﬁcates (for the household and land that he frequents or
refers). The other wives who live on separate plots will have cer-
iﬁcates for their respective parcels with their names written under
land holders’ and displaying their photographs instead of the hus-
ands’. The name of the husband will be written in the second line
nder ‘name of spouse’. If a polygamous household does not have
eparate land for each wife (which is not particularly common), the
ives’ names will appear under the ‘name of spouse’ line on a single
ertiﬁcate. The certiﬁcate does not explicitly state that the husband
nd wife have equal land rights, unlike in SNNP as we see below.
Second-stage registration is carried out by surveyors and reg-
strars in the pilot districts. The surveyors and the registrars
ollaborate to take GPS measurements, prepare temporary sketches
n the ﬁeld, prepare maps on a computer, and combine the plot-
evel measurements with household information. The second-stage
lot level certiﬁcates are printed on water resistant paper and
nclude (side by side) the names of both husband and wife, the
ize of the plot, GPS coordinates, a map  of the plot, a unique plot
ode and the plot code and holder names of the neighboring farms.
he regional government provides funding for the pilot areas and
riority areas where the second-stage registration and certiﬁcation
akes place. In addition, donor support has been received for some
f the pilot areas. Households retain both the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate
book) and the second-stage plot maps.
outhern Nations, Nationalities and People (SNNP) region
Land registration began in SNNP in 2004. Community-level Land
dministration Committees (LACs) were established and trained
longside Development Agents (agricultural extension staff). The
emarcation of individual plots of land proceeded based on the
ssumption that community and public land borders were known.
omplaints and disputes were resolved locally and, if necessary,
y district courts. Registry books were prepared at the commu-
ity level. District-level books were compiled but only contained
ummarized information at household level. Land certiﬁcates were
repared and signed at the district level, while photos were added
nd certiﬁcates stamped at the community level. The cost of cer-
iﬁcates included a card fee of 2 EB and 4 EB for photos (Holden and
efera, 2008). In SNNP, the certiﬁcate is supposed to contain the
ames and photos of both the husband and wife on the same page.
hile this guideline has nearly always been followed in Sidama, it
as not strictly followed in Wollaita. The rights and responsibili-
ies section of the certiﬁcate indicates that both the husband and
ife have equal rights to the land. The ﬁrst-stage land certiﬁcation
cheme has been discontinued or was never implemented in cer-
ain communities in Sidama where the second-stage registration
rocess has begun in the form of pilot projects. For example, in
ondo Genet district, which has been selected for the ELTAP pilot
roject, only 30% of the households received a ﬁrst-stage certiﬁ-
ate.
The second-stage registration is performed using hand-held GPS
evices to measure the plot dimensions and computers to regis-
er the data. Once the registration is completed, households are
ssued a single book listing all of their plots and containing the
ames of both the husband and wife as landholders. In addition,
eparate maps are issued for each plot. As in Oromia, households
n SNNP have not thus far been required to pay for the second-
tage certiﬁcate. In SNNP, most of the cost of the certiﬁcate waslicy 41 (2014) 193–205 197
covered through the ELTAP/ELAP project, but the regional govern-
ment also covered part of the cost. In contrast to Oromia, where
households are able to retain both the ﬁrst- and second-stage cer-
tiﬁcates, in SNNP, households return the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate when
they receive the second-stage certiﬁcate. Land administration ofﬁ-
cials seem to believe that the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate is obsolete once
a second-stage land registration and certiﬁcation starts. This may
also explain why  they suspended ﬁrst-stage registration in pilot
districts.
Data and descriptive statistics
A stratiﬁed random sample of 620 households was surveyed in
2007 in ﬁve districts in the Oromia and SNNP regions. Of these
households, 580 were surveyed again in 2012 with an additional
40 new households to maintain the 620-household sample size.
Locations were stratiﬁed to capture the differences between the
two regions. The sample includes districts with cereal-based, crop-
livestock systems; perennial systems with irrigation producing
cash crops; and perennial systems for subsistence production with-
out irrigation. In addition, communities with varying distances to
the district center were selected to capture variations in market
access and urban expansion pressure. In these two regions, land
certiﬁcates were allocated jointly to husbands and wives and were,
therefore, intended to strengthen women’s land rights. It is possible
that this gender focus affected the WTP  for second-stage certiﬁ-
cates.
There are two  components of the demand and WTP  questions
used in these surveys. The ﬁrst set of questions explores WTP  for
a ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate by asking household heads how much they
would pay to replace a lost ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate and whether and
how much they would pay for a ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate if they did
not have one. The second set of questions explores interest in a
second-stage certiﬁcate. The second-stage certiﬁcate is described
to household heads as a certiﬁcate with separate maps for each plot.
In the 2007 and 2012 surveys, household heads are asked about
their interest in receiving a second-stage certiﬁcate and how much
they would be willing to pay for it in cash and labor. In addition,
husbands and wives were separately asked about their assessments
of the proposed second-stage certiﬁcate in the 2012 survey.2 It is
possible that such questions lead to an overestimation of the WTP
for second-stage land certiﬁcation because the questions are hypo-
thetical and the WTP  is derived from those households that wish or
would prefer to have such a certiﬁcate. On the other hand, while we
believe the description of the second-stage certiﬁcate provided to
farmers is enough for their evaluation of its effect on tenure secu-
rity, we did not go further and elaborate on the potential beneﬁts
of the second-stage registration and certiﬁcation. It is possible that
farmers may  not realize the potential private beneﬁts related to
a computerized registration system such as facilitated inheritance
to children. The results should therefore be interpreted in light of
these caveats. The WTP  cash amounts were inﬂation adjusted to
ensure that the results obtained from the two survey rounds are
comparable.3
Table 1 indicates that more than 91% of households had their
land registered by 2007 and three-fourths had received a land cer-
tiﬁcate by 2012. In 2012, as many as 96% of households without
certiﬁcates report interest in obtaining a ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate, an
increase of 4% relative to 2007. Regarding the demand for second-2 The speciﬁc questions are reported in Appendix.
3 We used 2006 as a base year. The exchange rate was 8.4 EB per US$ in June 2006.
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Table 1
Household land certiﬁcation status and demand for second-stage certiﬁcate, Oromia and SNNP.
2007 2012
Percent Na Percent Na
Households whose land is registered 0.91 576 0.94 619
Households who  have land certiﬁcate 0.68 576 0.74 616
Households who  do not have land certiﬁcate but want one 0.92 186 0.96 161
Want  second-stage certiﬁcate with maps for each plot 0.71 530 0.54 610
Willing to sell land if it becomes legal 0.31 572 0.11 610
Source: Own survey data.
a N refers to number of respondents for each question. 576 households participated in the land related questions in 2007 and 620 in 2012.
Table 2
Real value of land certiﬁcatea and land in 2006 Birr and in labor days.
2007 2012 Median ratio
2012/2007
Median Min  Max. CV Median Min  Max. CV
Maximum WTP  for ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate 5.75 0.0 959 3.94 3.36 0.0 672 3.00 0.58
Maximum WTP  for lost ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate 5.75 0.0 1918 4.98 3.36 0.0 672 3.00 0.58
Maximum WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcate in Birr 9.59 0.0 671 2.16 3.36 0.0 336 3.33 0.35
Maximum WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcate in labor days 3 0.0 160 2.00 2 0.0 30 1.00 0.67
Minimum compensation acceptable if land is demanded for
public service (in Million EB per hectare)b
0.11 0.0 134 5.95 0.45 0.0 3360 7.71 4.24
Minimum price to sell land (in Million EB per hectare)b 0.11 0.0 7670 17.17 0.67 0.0 1510 6.00 6.34
Source: Own survey data.
a The WTP  for ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate is reported for those without a certiﬁcate, WTP  for lost ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate is reported for those households who already have one.
The  WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcate is reported by those who  want a second-stage certiﬁcate. The land values are reported by those households who were willing to report
i







































Shashemene 92 149 50 96
Arsi  Negelle 73 150 59 140
Wondo Genet 58 40 48 135
Wollaita 56 191 57 203
Total 71 530 54 610t.
b Minimum land values are less than 10,000EB which appear as zero here since v
ufﬁcient and their conﬁdence in this certiﬁcate has grown over
ime. Households may  also be wary of displacement if they asso-
iate the second round of measurement and registration with
ossible state expropriation of land for urban expansion. This is
articularly notable in Shashemene district, which is located near
he town of Shashemene, and the district’s residents have wit-
essed land expropriation in the past. A fear of tax increases may
e another reason for the decline in interest if farmers reported
wning smaller parcels than they actually held during the ﬁrst-
tage registration. During the second-stage registration, a number
f such cases were uncovered in Oromia, possibly indicating cor-
uption or inaccuracy during the ﬁrst-stage registration. This was
ot, however, particularly common.
The table also includes information on the respondents’ willing-
ess to sell their land if it became legal.4 Only a small percentage
f farmers indicated an interest in selling their farms. The rate of
ositive responses on this question declined from 31% in 2007
o 11% in 2012. This could indicate that land has become more
aluable to farmers or that they expect even higher prices in the
uture, meaning that most would prefer to retain their land for the
resent.
Table 2 presents inﬂation-adjusted WTP  estimates for ﬁrst- and
econd-stage certiﬁcates in 2006 EB. The median WTP  for a ﬁrst-
tage certiﬁcate declined from 5.8 EB in 2007 to 3.4 EB in 2012,
hile the median WTP  for a second-stage certiﬁcate declined from
.6 EB in 2007 to 3.4 EB in 2012. The alternative median mea-
ure, the maximum WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcates in labor days,
lso declined from 3 to 2 man-days from 2007 to 2012. However,
he inﬂation-adjusted value of land increased substantially over
his period. The minimum willingness to accept (WTA) price per
ectare of land increased by between four and six fold over the
4 In Ethiopia, land is owned by the state and hence cannot be sold or mortgaged.
armers have only user right.Source: Own  survey data.
5 years between the two surveys.5 This gives us good reasons to
question why we see this signiﬁcant decline in WTP  not only for
second-stage certiﬁcates but also for ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcates. More-
over, the median WTP  we  observed in our sample is much lower
than the lowest estimated cost for second-stage certiﬁcates (refer
to “Second-stage land registration and certiﬁcation” section).
Table 3 provides more disaggregated information on the
demand for ﬁrst-stage and second-stage land certiﬁcates by year
and district. The two  ﬁrst districts (Shashemene and Arsi Negelle) in
the Oromia region have cereal-based production and lack irrigation
but have good market access. Wondo Genet is a high-potential
perennial zone featuring cash crops, irrigation and good market
access. This district was also selected by ELTAP for second-stage
certiﬁcation. Wollaita is a low-potential perennial zone character-
ized by poorer market access and very high population density. We
note that the demand for second-stage certiﬁcates declines over
the period from 2007 to 2012 in all zones except Wollaita.
5 A signiﬁcant share of the sample refused to assign a value to the land, a sort of
refusal to accept that land can be taken or sold, which indicates the sensitivity and
insecurity felt by farmers.
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Table  4
Median willingness to pay for land certiﬁcate and median land values, disaggregated by district and year.
2007 2012
Shashemene Arsi Negele Wondo Genet Wollaita Shashemene Arsi Negele Wondo Genet Wollaita
Maximum WTP  for lost
certiﬁcate
5.75 9.59 9.59 4.79 3.70 6.72 6.72 3.36
Maximum WTP  for ﬁrst-stage
certiﬁcate
9.59 9.59 4.79 3.84 3.36 6.72 6.72 3.36
Maximum WTP  for
second-stage certiﬁcate
9.59 19.18 9.59 9.59 3.36 5.04 5.38 3.36
Minimum compensation
considered fair if land is
demanded for public service
(in Millions EB per hectare)
0.10 0.11 0.45 0.07 0.90 0.45 0.85 0.27
Minimum price to sell land (in
Millions EB per hectare)
0.10 0.12 0.45 0.07 1.34 0.74 0.67 0.45
Source: Own  survey data.
Note: Figures are median WTP  in 2006 Ethiopian Birr (EB).
Table 5
Distribution of WTP  values for second-stage certiﬁcate and households’ land valuation in 2012 (in 2006 EB).
District Willingness to pay for second-stage certiﬁcate (in EB per household)a Per hectare (compensation) land values (in Millions EB per hectare)b
Median Min  Max  CV Median Min  Max  CV
Shashemene 3.70 0 336.02 2.73 0.90 0.007 134 3.209
Arsi  Negele 4.20 0 33.60 0.92 0.45 0.018 896 6.996
Wondo Genet 5.38 0 168.01 2.11 0.85 0.005 3360 5.214
Wollaita 3.36 0 16.80 0.91 0.27 0.002 672 6.736


































has also declined but not to as great an extent. Of the farmers and
their spouses, one-ﬁfth still expects land redistribution. This could
be a potential source of tenure insecurity and a reason for their
Table 6





Indifferent-acceptable 15 25a Reported for households who reported interest in second-stage certiﬁcate.
b Reported for households who were willing to report the land values.
Table 4 provides data on median WTP  in 2007 and 2012 in the
ame four districts. The results indicate that the median WTP  val-
es declined in all districts from 2007 to 2012, particularly for
econd-stage certiﬁcates. The table also contains median land val-
es in terms of farmers’ assessments of fair compensation in the
vent of a land taking or the acceptable sales price if land sales
ere allowed. Here, we observe a sharp increase in land values
rom 2007 to 2012, particularly in Shashemene district, which is
xperiencing rapid urbanization. Wondo Genet, the zone featuring
ash crop cultivation and irrigation, had the highest land values in
007, but land values increased relatively less in this area than in
he others from 2007 to 2012. The decision by the ELTAP/ELAP to
arget Wondo Genet for second-stage land certiﬁcation does not
eem to have stimulated the interest in or WTP  for second-stage
ertiﬁcation in this cash cropping area focusing on cash crops. A
otential explanation for this is that residents already consider
heir tenure secure. Shashemene has experienced land takings
elated to urban expansion, but this does not seem to have affected
he WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcates. This could also indicate that
ouseholds do not believe that these certiﬁcates provide them with
ny additional security or more reliable information on land expro-
riation. To provide more detailed information on variation across
istricts, we present the distribution of the WTP  and land com-
ensation values in 2012 in Table 5. Although we only report the
TP for second-stage certiﬁcate for those households interested
n obtaining one, the minimum value is zero, indicating that some
ouseholds that are interested in the second-stage certiﬁcate do
ot wish to pay for it. There is substantially more variation in land
alues than in WTP  values. There is relatively less variation in WTP
or second-stage certiﬁcates across households in Wollaita, which
lso has the lowest average WTP. Conversely, the highest land val-
es are observed in Shashemene, where the variation in evaluations
cross households is the lowest.
As indicated earlier, husbands and wives were also separately
sked to evaluate the importance of the proposed second-stagecertiﬁcate. The available responses are: Bad/unnecessary, accept-
able/indifferent and good. Table 6 summarizes the responses of
men  and women.
Approximately 40% of men  and women believe that second-
stage certiﬁcation is an unnecessary or bad idea. Proportionately,
more men  have a positive attitude toward second-stage certiﬁca-
tion than women.
We  also explored farmers’ perceptions of their tenure security.
We identiﬁed two indicators: (1) whether they believe that the
existing ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcates protect against encroachment and
(2) whether farmers feel secure that they will not be subject to
further state land redistribution. Table 7 summarizes the results.
The responses to the ﬁrst question were at a household level, but
we have separate responses from men  and women  on the second
question.
It is clear from the table that farmers feel they have become more
secure over time with respect to the land certiﬁcates protecting
their land from other non-state threats such as encroachment by
neighbors. The proportion of households that believe that the land
certiﬁcate will protect them from encroachment doubled over the
5 years between the two surveys. The fear of land redistributionGood 47 34
Bad-unnecessary 38 41
Observation (N) 579 627
Source: Own  survey data.
200 S. Bezu, S. Holden / Land Use Po
Table 7































































ource: Own survey data.
eluctance to participate in further land registration. Further efforts
o raise awareness and assure farmers may  alleviate some of their
oncerns.
onceptual framework and empirical model
We  can conceptualize formalization of land rights as a con-
inuum of formalization intensity and quality where the cost of
ormalization increases with greater intensity and quality. Techno-
ogical advances imply a reduction in the costs to achieve a given
ntensity of formalization. This may  be visualized as a forward shift
n the formalization supply curve. Identifying the socially optimal
evel of formalization intensity requires identifying the formaliza-
ion demand curve. This demand curve will shift outward with the
ealth of a society, the size and quality of land, as captured by the
potential) value of land, the individual demand for tenure security,
he extent to which such security is threatened and the extent to
hich formalized land rights are believed to increase this security.
he demand may  also depend on the expectations and quality of
ther services provided by the land administrative system such as
air conﬂict resolution in land disputes and the effectiveness of this
ormalized system relative to a traditional conﬂict resolution sys-
em. The demand may  also be inﬂuenced by the level of knowledge
nd thus realism of expectations concerning the services that can
e provided and the ability to access the beneﬁts of the system.
urthermore, if formalization is also associated with strengthening
tatutory law, this may  have implications for whether the bundle of
ights and obligations and their distribution among landowners are
hanged. For example, if formalization is combined with a new pol-
cy to strengthen the land rights of women within households, there
s a redistributional element that goes beyond recognizing the land
ights that existed before the formalization. This may  then affect
he demand among old and new rights holders. New laws and reg-
lations that go further in specifying the obligations of landowners
s part of a formalization process, such as conservation obligations,
ay  also affect landowners’ level of demand for formalization.
Our aim in this study is to examine the demand for second-stage
ertiﬁcation. The second-stage certiﬁcate is expected to contain
ore detailed and precise information than the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁ-
ate. However, it is not obvious that the high level of precision
mplied by a second-stage certiﬁcate is worth the additional cost.
he low-cost, participatory approach in which neighbors serve as
itnesses employed in the ﬁrst-stage registration in Ethiopia may
rovide a substantially higher level of precision than the low-cost
PS devices that have been used in most of the pilot areas. The
dded value of this technology is therefore not boundary identiﬁ-
ation and protection against encroachment, but map  creation and
omputerized registration. It is questionable whether such maps
nhance tenure security. It is then appropriate to ask who should
ay for such intensiﬁed formalization. A computerized registry may
acilitate bequeathing of land to children, but owners may  not be
ware of such beneﬁts, and it is uncertain whether such a registrylicy 41 (2014) 193–205
would substantially enhance WTP. It is likely that the beneﬁts of
computerization and mapping are primarily social and only to a
small extent private. The tenure security effect of formalization is
private, and we  should expect it to be reﬂected in the demand and
WTP  for registration and certiﬁcates. However, it is possible that
the entire tenure security effect is captured in the ﬁrst-stage cer-
tiﬁcation. This may  also be the case for women in the household
where there is joint certiﬁcation. The other broader beneﬁts asso-
ciated with land titling, such as credit access and the transferability
of land, are irrelevant or less important under the restricted rights
regime in Ethiopia where land sales and mortgaging of land are
prohibited.
Speciﬁcally, the study tests the following hypotheses using data
from the 2007 and 2012 surveys.
H1. Demand and willingness to pay (WTP) for upgrading to second-
stage land certiﬁcation is low: We  argue that there are fewer private
beneﬁts to upgrading to a second-stage land certiﬁcate. The main
private beneﬁt of formalizing land rights in the Ethiopian context
is tenure security, which is already provided by the ﬁrst-stage cer-
tiﬁcation.
H2. WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcates will be higher the higher the
value of land. Farmers who have larger or higher-quality plots of
land, both in terms of productivity and location, are likely to pay
higher prices to protect their assets. These qualities are reﬂected
in the subjective value of the land, as land markets do not exist in
Ethiopia.
H3. WTP  for upgrading from ﬁrst-stage to second-stage certiﬁcate
increases over time. This is based on the assumption that the beneﬁts
from the ﬁrst-stage land registration and certiﬁcation deteriorate
over time due to poor updating and maintenance of records; there-
fore, farmers become more interested in upgraded registration.
Alternatively, we  may  argue that
H4. WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcates declines over time due to a
loss of momentum in the land registration and certiﬁcation process
and reduced expectations concerning beneﬁts from upgrading. This
could also result from a beneﬁcial effect of ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation
on tenure security that is enhanced over time.
H5. WTP  is higher for households that have been exposed to
informational meetings concerning the beneﬁts of land registration
and certiﬁcation. Information such as the implications of a com-
puterized registration system regarding facilitating land transfers
through bequests and gifts may  create greater interest and demand
in second-stage certiﬁcates in farming communities with low levels
of literacy.
H6. WTP  is higher for households that lack witnesses for their plot
boundaries from the ﬁrst-stage registration or have experienced
land disputes. This is simply because such households may hope
to gain additional security through a new land registration system
and obtain certiﬁcates that include maps of individual plots.
The empirical model for the willingness to pay for a second-
stage certiﬁcate is given by:
WTP2Cht = ˇ0 + ˇ1Aht + ˇ2Cht + ˇ3RQht + ˇ4CYht + ˇ5Mh + ˇ6Vh
+ ˇ7Dt + ˛h + εht
where WTP2Cht is the willingness to pay for a second-stage certiﬁ-
cate for household h in period t, A is farm size, C is a dummy  for
exposure to land conﬂicts, RQ is registration quality, CY is land cer-
tiﬁcate information, including whether one possessed a ﬁrst-stage
land certiﬁcate and whose name(s) is/are on the certiﬁcate, M is a
dummy for whether the household has been exposed to informa-
tional meetings regarding land certiﬁcation, V is a vector of village
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rban expansion, D is a year dummy, ˛h represents unobservable
ousehold factors, and εht is a random error term.
The household-level WTP  is given both in cash and in labor.
s indicated above, approximately 30% of households in 2007 and
6% in 2012 were not interested in the second-stage certiﬁcate.
hus, we only observe WTP  values for those who express interest
n obtaining one. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not an appropriate
egression framework to estimate the model, as it does not control
or the censoring of the WTP  values at zero and may  thus result
n negative predicted values. This model is best estimated using
ragg’s (Cragg, 1971) two-part truncated normal hurdle model.
ragg’s speciﬁcation disaggregates the decision into a participa-
ion equation and an amount equation and yields positive predicted
alues for the amount equation. This model speciﬁcation employs a
robit for the participation equation and a truncated normal model
or the amount equation. The model assumes that, conditional on
 set of observed covariates, the mechanisms determining partici-
ation and amounts are independent. In our WTP  model, the two
omponents are: (1) a probit model for ‘interest in a second-stage
ertiﬁcate’ using the full sample and (2) a truncated normal model
or ‘maximum willingness to pay’ using the sub-sample of inter-
sted households.
Because we are using panel data, we can control for unob-
erved heterogeneity in addition to the observed covariates. In our
odel, we employ a Correlated Random Effect (CRE) model follow-
ng Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) because ﬁxed effects
stimation is difﬁcult to implement for nonlinear models due to
he incidental parameter problem. The estimation procedure in CRE
nvolves adding the mean of time-varying variables as an additional
et of explanatory variables. The inclusion of these means controls
or time-constant unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010).
esults and discussion
stimation result
The results of the Double-Hurdle model are reported in Table 8.
he ﬁrst two columns report the results from the probit model
or the probability of being interested in second-stage certiﬁcate
hurdle 1). The next four columns report results from the trun-
ated regression models for WTP  (hurdle 2).6 The observations in
he probit model include all households in both periods, while the
runcated regression model includes only those households that
re interested in a second-stage certiﬁcate. We  estimated WTP  in
oth cash (middle two columns) and labor-days (last two  columns).
We ﬁrst analyze the factors inﬂuencing the probability of being
nterested in a second-stage certiﬁcate. We  ﬁnd that households
hat experienced a land dispute before the ﬁrst-stage land reg-
stration was implemented are more likely to be interested in
 second-stage certiﬁcate, indicating that experiences of con-
ict result in greater tenure insecurity and thus greater demand
or certiﬁcates beyond what the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcates have pro-
ided. Respondents who attended public informational meetings
egarding land registration are also more likely to be interested in
 second-stage certiﬁcate. This is perhaps because they are more
nformed of land registration, the various types of certiﬁcates and
heir beneﬁts. However, households that reported having sufﬁ-
ient witnesses during the ﬁrst-stage registration are less likely to
ish to obtain a second-stage certiﬁcate, indicating that the ﬁrst-
tage certiﬁcate provides sufﬁcient plot boundary security for such
6 It is possible that the two decisions are correlated, even after controlling for
bserved covariates. If this is the case, the WTP  equation has to be corrected for
election. Our test for selection bias using the Heckman selection model does not
ndicate a selection problem.licy 41 (2014) 193–205 201
households. Having a land certiﬁcate was  not signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with interest in second-stage certiﬁcates, but households that
only have the husband’s name listed on the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate are
less likely to exhibit interest in second-stage certiﬁcates. We  may
speculate that male heads of households perceive there to be an
advantage of retaining the certiﬁcate that only includes their name
instead of obtaining a second-stage certiﬁcate that may  include
both the husband’s and his wife’s names. The age of household head
was negatively associated with interest in obtaining a second-stage
certiﬁcate, which could be because older household heads feel more
secure with respect to their land tenure. However, it could also be
due to resistance to change, as they have witnessed frequent land
redistributions in the past. Controlling for other factors, interest
in obtaining a second-stage certiﬁcate declined signiﬁcantly from
2007 to 2012, indicating that the decline in momentum and farm-
ers’ expectations regarding second-stage certiﬁcation dominates
any concern farmers might have concerning an erosion of the ben-
eﬁts of ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation. We  also ﬁnd that households in
Wondo Genet and Wollaita, the two most densely populated areas,
are less likely to exhibit interest in second-stage certiﬁcates than
households in Shashemene.
We next examine factors that inﬂuence the willingness to pay
(WTP) for second-stage certiﬁcates among interested households.
Farm size is now negatively correlated with the willingness to pay,
whether reported in cash or in labor-days. This could be a land
scarcity effect, such that more land-scarce households are will-
ing to pay more to secure their rights, ceteris paribus However,
if land scarcity is correlated with poverty and poor market access,
this could limit WTP  and possibly explain the lower WTP  observed
in Wollaita. Compared to Shashemene, the WTP  for households
in Wollaita was  17% and 8% lower in cash and in labor, respec-
tively. Similarly, WTP  declined signiﬁcantly from 2007 to 2012,
with a 5% decline in WTP  in cash and a 1.5% decline WTP  in
labor. All of the above variables were signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁ-
cance level. Female-headed households were no more or less likely
than male-headed household to demonstrate interest in obtain-
ing a second-stage certiﬁcate. But, among interested households,
female-headed households had 6.7% lower WTP  in cash but their
WTP  in labor was not statically different from that of other house-
holds. This may  be related to the greater liquidity constraint faced
by most female-headed households in rural areas. Attending a pub-
lic meeting before registration was  positively correlated with WTP,
but it was only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Having only the hus-
band’s name on the certiﬁcate was negatively correlated with WTP
in the labor equation but only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
It is possible that there are two  forces working in opposite direc-
tions with respect to farm size. On the one hand, as farm size
typically affects the value of the land for which a second-stage cer-
tiﬁcate may  be issued, the willingness to pay may  be higher for
larger farms. On the other hand, a fear of land expropriation, which
may  be more pronounced on larger farms, may negatively inﬂuence
the WTP  for the new certiﬁcate. Although land sales are prohibited
in Ethiopia, and farmers have only user rights, they have a subjec-
tive valuation of their land that depends, among other things, on
farm size, the quality of the land, the proximity to urban areas, the
presence of irrigation and household characteristics. Table 9 reports
estimation results from the regression models that include farm-
ers’ subjective values of their land. These values are the minimum
compensation households were willing to accept in the event that
their land is expropriated for public use. Because a signiﬁcant per-
centage of households were unwilling to report these values, the
number of observations considered in this analysis is reduced by
40%. We  include this model to assess the robustness of our results.
In addition to the land values, we  also allowed for variation in the
WTP  for land of a similar value depending on how near a household
is located to an urban area using a dummy  variable that takes value
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Table 8
Factors associated with the demand and willingness to pay for second-stage certiﬁcate in cash and in labor. Double-Hurdle Model.
Interested in second-stage certiﬁcate
Probit model
Amount/willingness to pay (in Cash)
Truncated regression
Amount/willingness to pay (in labor-days)
Truncated regression
Marginal effects Robust Std. Err Elasticities Robust Std. Err Elasticities Robust Std. Err
Farm size per capita
(ha)








−0.123** 0.049 0.037 0.140 −0.116 0.103
Household has land
certiﬁcate
−0.062 0.060 0.035 0.146 −0.028 0.096
Only  husband name on
the certiﬁcate




0.090*** 0.034 0.140* 0.085 0.066 0.059
Female headed
household
−0.039 0.110 −0.067** 0.030 −0.010 0.021
Age  of household head −0.003** 0.001 −0.002 0.153 −0.048 0.113
Total  number of male
members
−0.010 0.017 0.231 0.182 0.012 0.142
Household size −0.002 0.010 0.038 0.141 −0.003 0.149
District dummies: baseline-Shashemene
Arsi Negele −0.068 0.043 0.023 0.037 0.003 0.027
Wondo Genet −0.179*** 0.060 0.016 0.020 −0.007 0.015
Wollaita −0.136*** 0.039 −0.165*** 0.044 −0.082*** 0.028
Year  2012, dummy  −0.111*** 0.032 −0.501*** 0.049 −0.153*** 0.036
Constant (Coefﬁcient) 1.110*** 0.234 2.404*** 0.263 1.636*** 0.179
Sigma constant 1.024*** 0.046 0.726*** 0.036
Chi2 92.3 205.5 66.4
Prob  > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
































tn  these models, but they are not included in the table to save space.
* Signiﬁcance at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1%.
ne if the household is located in a village near to an urban area
nd include the interaction between this dummy  variable and the
and value variable.
The results from the probit model in Table 9 indicate that house-
olds that have larger land values are less likely to be interested
n a second-stage certiﬁcate. The coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the
% level of signiﬁcance. This may  indicate that households do not
elieve that second-stage certiﬁcates provide protection against
xpropriation, as more valuable land may  be near urban areas,
here such risks are higher, or those with more valuable land do
ot fear the loss of their land and therefore do not believe that
hey need second-stage certiﬁcates. However, among households
hat were interested in obtaining second-stage certiﬁcates, those
ith larger land values had a higher WTP  in cash, and the loca-
ion of the highly valued land (peri-urban or not) did not affect the
agnitude (Table 9, second model). This indicates that the will-
ngness to pay of those who perceived beneﬁts from second-stage
ertiﬁcates increased in their valuations of their land. Farm size
ad the same effect in the new models as before with even larger
egative elasticities in both WTP  in cash and labor. A 1 percentage
oint decrease in per capita farm size is associated with a 2 percent-
ge point increase in the amount households are willing to pay for
econd-stage certiﬁcates, indicating that increasing land scarcity is
riving up the WTP  for second-stage land certiﬁcates. Households
ocated in peri-urban areas had higher WTP. The coefﬁcients for all
ther variables had the same signs as in the model without land
alues, but we have fewer statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in
he current models, perhaps because of the signiﬁcant reductionin the number of observations and hence variation in the
data.
Predicted willingness-to-pay in Oromia and SNNP
We  tried to obtain an estimate of WTP  for households in Oromia
and SNNP based on our empirical model. Table 10 reports the pre-
dicted values of WTP  based on the Double-Hurdle model but only
considers the most recent data (2012 data) in the prediction. The
median WTP  is approximately 7 EB for Arsi Negele, Wondo Genet
and Shashemene and 3.5 EB for Wollaita. When disaggregated by
farm size, WTP  exhibits some variation across the three compara-
ble districts. The highest WTP  is to be expected from households
in Shashemene. Compared to the three other districts, households
in Wollaita have the lowest WTP. In all districts, households that
were willing to pay the most were those with land sizes in the third
quartile.
Fig. 1 provides a more visual presentation of the relationship
between predicted WTP  and farm size. We  use a two-way graph
with local polynomial smoothing to plot the relationship between
WTP  and farm size. The WTP  values are never more than 8 EB. We
ﬁnd that for Shashemene and Arsi Negele, the predicted WTP  is
higher, with values not falling below 6 EB for all farm size levels,
but there is more dispersion in the WTP  in Shashemene. In Wondo
Genet, the WTP  is mostly close to that of the two Oromia districts
but it declines and the dispersion increases after approximately
1.3 ha of land. In Wollaita, the WTP  is lower than 4EB at all land
size levels. Wollaita also has the least dispersion in predicted WTP.
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Table  9
Factors associated with the demand and willingness to pay for second-stage certiﬁcate in cash and in labor. DH Model (with land values).
Probability of being interested in
second-stage certiﬁcate
Amount interested households are
willing to pay (in cash)
Amount interested households are
willing to pay (in labor-days)
Marginal
Effects
Robust Std. Err Elasticities Robust Std. Err Elasticities Robust Std. Err
Ln (land values) −0.075*** 0.027 0.060** 0.030 −0.030 0.019
Household farm size (ha) 0.000 0.000 −0.222*** 0.062 −0.191*** 0.051
Experience land dispute before
land registration
0.051 0.042 −0.003 0.033 0.001 0.027
Have  sufﬁcient witnesses to
conﬁrm plot borders
−0.034 0.058 −0.159 0.157 −0.095 0.121
Household has land certiﬁcate −0.007 0.072 0.131 0.172 0.027 0.122
Only  husband name on the
certiﬁcate
−0.181*** 0.065 −0.007 0.016 −0.021* 0.013
Attended public meeting
before land registration
0.108** 0.042 0.131 0.111 0.084 0.071
Female headed household 0.054 0.139 −0.060** 0.029 −0.009 0.017
Age  of household head −0.001 0.001 −0.088 0.192 −0.051 0.142
Total  number of male members −0.007 0.021 0.307 0.221 0.125 0.161
Household size −0.003 0.013 0.120 0.209 −0.209 0.170
District dummies: baseline-Shashemene
Arsi Negele −0.112* 0.063 0.042 0.035 0.001 0.027
Wondo Genet −0.148* 0.084 −0.025 0.037 −0.005 0.028
Wollaita −0.255*** 0.053 −0.102 0.084 −0.127*** 0.048
Farm  located in peri-urban area 0.098 0.263 0.217* 0.116 −0.062 0.086
Peri-urban area × land value −0.014 0.019 −0.163 0.112 0.054 0.078
Year  2012, dummy −0.021 0.049 −0.516*** 0.077 −0.108** 0.051
Constant (coefﬁcient) 1.444*** 0.435 1.789*** 0.445 1.827*** 0.283
Sigma  constant 1.004*** 0.059 0.714*** 0.049
Chi2 68.451 157.8 51.4
Prob  > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loglikelihood −397.442 −516.2 −369.6
Number of observations 649 388 381
Note: The dependent variables in the amount equations (cash and labor days) are log-transformed. The mean of time varying variables are included as additional regressors
in  this model, but they are not included in the table to save space.
* Signiﬁcance at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance at 5%.























Farm size in hectares
*The 2012 data is used for prediction.  The amount  is in real 2012 Ethiopian Birr  (base year 2006)
Plot  of  predict ed WTP in cash for diff erent  farm size
Local polynomial smooth with 95% CI
Fig. 1. Expected willingness-to-pay for second-stage certiﬁcate for districts in Oromia and SNNP.
204 S. Bezu, S. Holden / Land Use Policy 41 (2014) 193–205
Table 10
Expected willingness to pay by farm size and district.
Farm size Shashemene Arsi Negele Wondo Genet Wollaita
Min. Med. Max. Min. Med. Max. Min. Med. Max. Min. Med. Max.
Quartile 1 3.50 5.90 18.13 3.95 6.40 10.36 3.96 6.43 8.54 1.80 3.42 4.49
Quartile 2 3.95 6.62 12.06 4.85 7.03 8.12 3.96 6.42 10.30 1.77 3.53 5.09
Quartile 3 3.15 6.81 25.29 3.24 6.55 11.89 3.54 6.66 8.09 1.87 3.65 4.79




















































aTotal  3.15 6.71 25.29 3.24 6.63 
ource: Model prediction from the HD model estimated in section 6
ote: We use only the 2012 survey data for prediction since it is the most recent; D
To summarize the assessment of our hypotheses, we  cannot
eject Hypothesis 1, that demand and WTP  for second-stage cer-
iﬁcates are low, as we found that the WTP  is substantially lower
han the administrative costs of implementing the second-stage
ertiﬁcation.
We cannot reject Hypothesis 2 that WTP  increases with land val-
es, but the evidence is weak. While we observed a strong, negative
orrelation between interest in obtaining a second-stage certiﬁcate
nd land values, which inclines us to reject the hypothesis, we  also
bserved a positive relationship between values and the amount
hat interested households are willing to pay. However, this pos-
tive relationship is only weakly signiﬁcant. Land values may also
e correlated with farm size within areas, and we ﬁnd that greater
and scarcity within the household was associated with higher WTP
or second-stage certiﬁcates. Therefore, this also supports rejection
f the hypothesis. Thus, it seems to be poverty in land rather than
n land values that increases WTP.
Hypothesis 3 that WTP  increases over time, is rejected. We  found
o indications that the effect of the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation has dete-
iorated. Rather, it may  be the case that the tenure security effect of
he ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation grew over the period from 2007 to 2012
s ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcates gained recognition (see Table 6). How-
ver, we could not reject Hypothesis 4, which states that WTP  has
eclined over time. This result may  be due to a loss of momentum
nd interest and more realistic expectations regarding the bene-
ts. Second-stage certiﬁcation may  also be associated with fears
f land expropriation and been implemented in areas facing more
ynamic developments and land use changes such as urban expan-
ion. Informal discussions with farmers revealed that they were
omewhat concerned that parcel-level registration may  increase
heir land tax liability. Currently, the tax on agricultural land is
ollected as a fee per hectare of land cultivated regardless of the
ocation or productivity of the land. The fear is that each plot may
e used as a basis for a separate land tax, perhaps according to the
uality, instead of a ﬂat land use fee per hectare. Although we  do not
now how widespread this belief is, it is clear that a lack of infor-
ation regarding the purpose of the new land registration plays an
mportant role.
We cannot reject Hypothesis 5, stating that WTP  is higher for
ouseholds that have been exposed to informational meetings
n land registration and certiﬁcation. It is clear that those who
ttended these meetings had signiﬁcantly higher interest in and
TP  for second-stage certiﬁcates. This may  not only be an infor-
ational effect, however. It could also be a demand effect, as those
ith higher levels of demand for documentation of their land
ights were also more likely to attend meetings on the subject.
he informational meetings we consider in this analysis were pri-
arily awareness meetings during the ﬁrst-stage registration and
ertiﬁcation. Our assessment from our discussions with farmers,
evelopment agents and ofﬁcials is that, as opposed to the case for
he ﬁrst-stage land registration and certiﬁcation, little effort was
evoted to raising awareness of the second-stage land registration
nd certiﬁcation.89 3.06 6.60 10.30 1.77 3.49 5.09
 speciﬁc quartiles are computed to group household by their farm size.
Finally, we  cannot reject Hypothesis 6, which states that WTP
for a second-stage certiﬁcate is higher for households that are more
insecure of their land tenure due to exposure to land conﬂicts or
lack of witnesses.
Conclusion
Our study has revealed a relatively low demand and WTP  for
second-stage certiﬁcates. The added value of these second-stage
certiﬁcates is perceived to be low. The impression is that they do not
substantially enhance tenure security relative to ﬁrst-stage certiﬁ-
cates unless there was a problem during the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation.
Most households believed that they had sufﬁcient witnesses in the
neighborhood that could assist in verifying the correct placement
of plot borders. Inaccurate maps created based on measurements
obtained via handheld GPS devices provide less reliable informa-
tion on the location of plot borders. That we  noted a signiﬁcant
reduction in WTP  for second-stage certiﬁcates from 2007 to 2012
while perceived land values increased dramatically over the same
period may  indicate that the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation was success-
ful in creating the demanded tenure security. The strong negative
correlation we observe between farm size and demand for second-
stage certiﬁcates indicates that poverty in land drives up WTP  for
second-stage certiﬁcates.
The beneﬁts from second-stage certiﬁcation appear small for
the individual farmers, while they may  provide a better basis for
land administration and generate public documentation of land-
related affairs. The present study exclusively focuses on the private
beneﬁts of second-stage certiﬁcates to farm households. However,
other social beneﬁts of the second-stage registration and certiﬁca-
tion may  be more important and justify its implementation. If that
is the case, a detailed cost-beneﬁt analysis should examine all rel-
evant beneﬁts and costs, including the time required to complete
the registration and continuously update the data. In the mean time,
caution should also be taken so that second-stage certiﬁcation does
not undermine the positive effects of the ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcation
such as the joint certiﬁcation of husbands and wives. We  believe
that further pilot testing of the second-stage certiﬁcation is needed
and may  be useful to prioritize to speciﬁc areas such as those subject
to rapid urban expansion and may  be used to improve the coordina-
tion of urban and rural land registration and certiﬁcation in ways
that can enhance the tenure security of land holders and ensure
appropriate compensation in cases of land expropriation.
Appendix.
Willingness to pay questions from the survey questionnaire
WTP  for ﬁrst-stage certiﬁcate is explored using the following
question:
1. If you lose your certiﬁcate, how much would you be willing to
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. If you do not (did not) have a certiﬁcate, do (would) you want to
get a certiﬁcate? 1 = Yes, 0 = No
. If yes, how much would you be willing to pay for it at the maxi-
mum?
The following questions explore the demand and WTP  for
econd-stage certiﬁcate.
. Would you prefer to receive a new land certiﬁcate with a map  of
each of your plots, with clear identiﬁcation of the location and
size and shape of the plot? 1 = Yes, 0 = No
. If yes
a. How much is your maximum willingness to pay for such a
certiﬁcate for each of your plots?
b. How many separate parcels (plots) do you have?
c. What is your maximum WTP  for all parcels (one certiﬁcate
with map  for each plot)
. If yes, how many days are you maximum willing to work for the
kebelle to obtain such certiﬁcates for all your plots?
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